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Abstract 
This paper adds to growing interest in public to private buy-outs and mechanisms to 
ensure bid success. Using a unique, hand-collected dataset of 155 public to private 
buy-outs we provide one of the first examinations of the determinants of irrevocable 
commitments. Irrevocable commitments involve undertakings given by existing 
shareholders to agree to sell their shares to the bidder before the bid to take the 
company private is announced. We find that, for management buy-outs, the level of 
irrevocable commitments is increased by the bid premium, the reputation of the 
private equity backer and board shareholdings. The level of irrevocable commitments 
is reduced by rumours of a takeover bid and bid value. We therefore find evidence 
that management and private equity firms’ activity prior to the bid’s announcement 
can have an important impact on the process of going private. 
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Irrevocable Commitments and Going Private 
 
1. Introduction 
There is growing recognition that hostile, and competing, public bids represent only a 
small part of the takeover process (Schwert, 1996; 2000; Moeller et al,  2004). Rather, 
many takeovers are either friendly (Weir and Laing 2003) or  involve private actions 
and bargaining processes before the bid becomes public (Hansen, 2001; Boone and 
Mulherin 2002, 2003).  
 
The goal of this paper is to add to this debate by addressing an important but 
neglected aspect of the takeover process, namely irrevocable commitments. These are 
undertakings given by existing shareholders to agree to sell their shares to the bidder 
before the bid is announced and so represent a measure of private activity (Berwin, 
2003). They are an established feature of takeover transactions and are explicitly 
recognised in UK corporate law and takeover codes. They are part of the public bid 
process because they have to be made public when the bid is announced but obtaining 
them also involves private actions by the bidder prior to the bid announcement. 
Significant irrevocable commitments are also likely to deter alternative bidders. 
Gaining irrevocable commitments, therefore, involves actions by a bidder to ensure 
that they maximize the probability of success. In this paper, we discuss irrevocable 
commitments in relation to public to private transactions (PTPs) and examine the 
factors that determine the level of irrevocable commitments obtained by the bidder 
from existing shareholders. 
 
PTP transactions represent a novel form of takeover in which a listed 
corporation is taken private as an independent company with a new ownership and 
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new financing structure, traditionally involving significant debt. UK PTPs provide a 
particularly fertile context to study irrevocable commitments for a number of reasons. 
First, the UK has experienced a significant change in the way in which the market for 
corporate control operates with PTPs accounting for 30% of all acquisitions of 
publicly quoted companies by the early 2000s compared with only 4% during the 
early 1990s. Second, irrevocable commitments play a central role in the sale process 
of these PTPs (CMBOR, 2003). For example, during the period 1998-2003 the mean 
level of irrevocable commitments in UK PTPs accounted for 42.25% of equity. Third, 
the UK PTP sector is characterized by a very low level of public bidding by 
competing or hostile bidders. Fourth, private equity firms play an important role in 
negotiating and financing PTPs (CMBOR, 2003). It is therefore relevant to analyse 
their involvement in gaining irrevocable commitments. 
 
The paper extends existing literatures on both the bid process and PTP buy-
outs. Previous literature on the bid process has considered a number of aspects. One, 
toehold bids may be used where the seller controls the sale process but may be 
problematical (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Bulow et al., 1999). Two, Cornu and Isakov 
(2000) show that the medium of payment may be used to deter other buyers from 
entering the market. Three, information may be disclosed privately to a limited 
number of potential buyers before a takeover bid becomes public (Boone and 
Mulherin, 2002; 2003). Four, bidders may privately negotiate lock-up options from 
target management which may deter other bidders (Burch, 2001). Fifth, and similar to 
lock-ups, termination fees may be negotiated. These are payable to the bidder by the 
target if a merger is not consummated after a merger agreement is signed by the 
company’s board of directors (Officer, 2003). An examination of the determinants of 
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lock-up and termination fee usage by Coates and Subramanian (2000,) shows that 
target termination fees are more likely with larger targets and the use of tender offers. 
 
The literature on PTP buy-outs has tended to compare the characteristics of 
firms going private with those that remained public. These studies have analysed 
performance (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Kieschnick, 1998; Opler and Titman, 1993), 
governance characteristics (Baliga, et al 1996; Weir et al 2005a), the potential tax 
advantages of going private (Kaplan, 1989; Halpern et al., 1999), the wealth effects 
gained by shareholders in firms going private (De Angelo et al  1984; Lee et al., 1992; 
Easterwood et al., 1994; Renneboog et al., 2005), and the role of pressure from the 
market for corporate control (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Halpern et al., 1999). In 
addition, Citron et al (2003) have analysed the recovery rates of creditors when 
management buyouts fail. The pre-investment valuation methods used by venture 
capitalists, which play a significant role in the European buy-out market, have been 
studied by Manigart et al., (2000). The LBO literature more generally has considered 
the role of the reputation of LBO associations and private equity firms in influencing 
the longevity of buy-outs (Kaplan 1991) and in the performance of IPOs of private 
equity-backed buy-outs (Jelic, et al., 2005).   
 
The paper builds on these literatures and makes a number of contributions to 
our understanding of the bid process. First, in contrast to much of the existing LBO 
literature which concentrates on the end of the PTP transaction, this paper examines 
an aspect of the process up to a bid being announced. Second, and related to the first 
point, an understanding of the importance of private, pre-announcement activity, may 
offer insights into the apparent increase in the frequency of non-hostile takeover 
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activity, for example, only seven, or 4.5%, of our sample experienced a hostile bid. 
Third, we analyse the factors that influence the willingness of current shareholders to 
give irrevocable commitments to accept an offer before the bid is made public. 
Fourth, we analyse differences between internally driven management buy-outs 
(MBOs) and externally driven management buy-ins, (MBIs) since these differences 
may influence the ability of the bidder to obtain irrevocable commitments. Fifth, we 
build on evidence of the important certification effect of private equity firms in IPOs 
to consider whether commitment to a proposed PTP involving a reputable private 
equity firm signals to existing shareholders that the firm may be benefit from being 
taken private, particularly if there is unlikely to be an alternative buyer.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
The basis for the analysis consists of a unique, hand-collected dataset 
involving PTP transactions completed in the UK during the period 1998 to 2003,. As 
Figure 1 shows, prior to 1998, PTP activity was extremely low so the period analysed 
covers the years when PTP activity had increased significantly.  
 
For PTPs in general, we find that the less the takeover speculation, the higher 
the bid value and the larger the board shareholdings, the higher the level of 
irrevocable commitments We find that those proposing a management buyout (MBO) 
are more likely to gain the backing of other shareholders the greater the bid premium 
and the more likely the private equity backer is to be reputable. Irrevocable 
commitments are also more likely to be higher if there is less takeover interest from 
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other firms and the larger the value of the bid. In contrast, the MBI results are less 
encouraging.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the 
nature of the bid process and irrevocable commitments. Section 3 develops 
hypotheses relating to the determinants of the level of irrevocable commitments. 
Section 4 provides an overview of the development of PTPs in the UK. It also 
describes data sources and examines the sample characteristics, outlines the model 
specification and defines the variables. The results are presented in Section 5 and the 
final section presents some conclusions. 
 
2. The bid process and irrevocable commitments 
In this section, we provide a discussion of the takeover process and the importance of 
irrevocable commitments to that process. 
 
2.1. The sales process 
Boone and Mulherin (2003) identify a five step sales process consisting of an 
initiation event, contact with potential buyers, signing confidentiality agreements, 
private bidding and finally public bidding. They recognize that the initiation can come 
from either the seller or buyer. This process is similar to that which occurs in the UK. 
However, as far as we are aware, there is no publicly available information about step 
four, private bidding. It is therefore not possible to use official documents to assess 
the extent of activity before a bid is announced. In addition, the private auction 
process implies an agreement between buyer and seller about the conduct of a bid. 
Unlike in the US, this is very uncommon in the UK (Freshfields et al, 2002). 
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2.2. The sales process and irrevocable commitments  
By examining irrevocable commitments it is possible to gain important insights into 
the bid process because obtaining them involves private actions by the bidder before 
the bid is announced.  Irrevocable commitments are explicitly recognized in UK 
corporate law and takeover codes. The UK’s City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
includes both rules concerning the conduct of management buy-outs of listed 
corporations and restrictions relating to irrevocable commitments in terms of the 
number of shareholders that can be approached to obtain irrevocable commitments, 
the prohibition of favourable treatment for those offering irrevocable commitments 
without Takeover Panel consent, and the disclosure of irrevocable commitments.  
 
The importance of irrevocable commitments to reducing the risk of failure of 
the buy-out bid is highlighted by both the costs of undertaking such transactions and 
the regulations governing them in the UK. The costs of undertaking a PTP that fails to 
be completed can be high and hence gaining irrevocable commitments may be 
regarded as a means of avoiding these costs. Private equity financiers report that the 
costs of undertaking a PTP far exceed those involved in other buy-out deals and can 
amount to 10% of the transaction value (CMBOR, 1999). As PTPs are generally 
funded by small amounts of private equity and significant amounts of leverage raised 
specifically to fund the purchase, bid failure may mean that the bidder is left as a 
minority holder which faces the difficulty of unloading shares to repay debt in what 
may be an illiquid market. In these circumstances, irrevocable commitments may be 
especially relevant since they can alleviate some of the uncertainties associated with 
the bid process.  
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With respect to takeover regulations, to take a company private in the UK, the 
bidder must achieve 75% of the equity (Sterling and Wright, 1990). It is unusual for a 
bidder to declare the bid unconditional when it holds less than the 75% of the ordinary 
stock it needs to be able re-register the corporation as private company However, it is 
generally necessary to acquire 90% plus of the equity because this enables the bidder 
to compulsorily purchase the remaining minority shareholdings. If the buy-out bid 
acquires between 75% and 90% of common stock the buyer can seek to pass a special 
resolution to re-register the corporation as a private company. However, minority 
stockholdings of at least 5% in nominal value of the issued stock or at least 50 
members can apply within 28 days to the court to cancel the resolution. If a 
dissentient minority has 25% plus of the common stock they can block resolution to 
go private. Once a company is re-registered as private, the new owners can take 
advantage of the private company’s exemptions from the financial assistance rules of 
the Companies Act (Berwin, 2003).  
 
Gaining irrevocable commitments therefore means that the bidder is sending a 
signal to other non-committed shareholders about the quality of the deal. The 
announcement of substantial irrevocable commitments may also make other potential 
bidders less likely to enter the contest with an alternative bid. If they do, a competing 
bid must be made within twenty-one days of the posting of the offer documents. It 
may, however, be difficult for an alternative buyer to complete due diligence within 
the required time. Private equity firms considering bidding are in particular likely to 
want to undertake due diligence (Graham, 2001; Berwin, 2003). Existing shareholders 
may also have the incentive to give irrevocable commitments as they may be able to 
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negotiate conditions that enable them to sell their shares to a new bidder offering a 
higher price (so-called ‘soft’ commitments) (Berwin, 2003).  
 
3. Factors affecting the level of irrevocable commitments 
Having discussed the importance of irrevocable commitments, we consider the 
following potential influences on the level of irrevocable commitments: the size of the 
transaction; the bid premium offered; the extent of press speculation about takeovers; 
the reputation of private equity financiers; the size of shareholding held by board 
members; and the accounting performance of the firm.  
 
3.1. Bid Value 
The problem for acquirers where the target has dispersed stockholders is well-
recognized (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Given that shareholdings are likely to be more 
dispersed in larger corporations, it will be more difficult for PTP bidders to gain the 
support of significant numbers of shareholders. However, the smaller the PTP, the 
more likely it is that the bidder will be able to gain substantial support for their plans. 
Hence, we expect that the larger the value of the deal, the more difficult it will be to 
gain significant irrevocable undertakings. We expect that this relationship will hold 
for PTPs involving both MBOs and MBIs. Hence: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the value of a PTP and the extent of 
irrevocable commitments.  
  
3.2. Return on assets 
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If a company is performing poorly, with little apparent prospect of recovery, there is 
less incentive for the shareholders to maintain their stake in the company. Poorly 
performing firms are likely to offer little in the way of dividends paid or capital gains 
which means that existing shareholders are likely to be looking for an exit route. In 
such cases, institutional investors may be willing to encourage an MBO bid as this 
may be the only feasible means by which they can effect an exit. In an environment of 
few hostile bidders competing to take over under-performing asserts and replace 
management, a bid by a corporate acquirer may not emerge. The emergence of MBIs 
backed by private equity firms provides an alternative where incumbent management 
may not have performed effectively enough to secure institutional support. 
Institutional shareholders may be more willing to give irrevocable commitments to 
MBIs because they expect incoming management to improve performance. It is 
therefore expected that irrevocable commitments will be higher the poorer the 
company performance in PTPs involving both MBOs and MBIs. Hence: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between pre-PTP performance and the extent of 
irrevocable commitments.  
 
3.3. Bid premium 
Acquirers typically need to offer a premium on the prevailing share price to persuade 
existing stockholders to sell. There is extensive evidence that premia are higher in 
hostile rather than friendly bids (Jarrell, et al., 1988). Public to private buy-out 
transactions also generate significant bid premia. A series of studies (DeAngelo et al., 
1984; Toradzadeh and Bertin, 1987; Kaplan, 1989; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989); Marais et 
al., 1989) have each found significant abnormal gains for the target’s shareholders 
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around the time of the announcement to go private. The implied bid premium appears 
even larger than that found in conventional acquisitions as sellers aim to capture some 
of the expected future gains from the improved incentive and governance mechanisms 
introduced on buy-out.  
 
In order to persuade existing shareholders to commit to the PTP, bidders may 
need to offer a premium sufficiently above the current share price that minimizes the 
likelihood of an alternative bidder emerging and which also reflects at least part of the 
expected future gains from the PTP. The higher the bid premium, the more likely 
existing shareholders will support a bid because of the financial windfall. Institutional 
investors may recognise that managers proposing an MBO may have greater private 
information about future prospects. For institutional investors to be convinced that 
incumbents are not exploiting this information to their detriment, they may expect a 
higher premium to be offered. Management and their private equity firm backers may 
also recognise that, since it would send a negative signal about their behaviour if they 
were subsequently to increase their bid, they need to offer a sufficiently attractive bid 
from the outset. Indeed, following concerns about the offer in the Magnet buy-out in 
1989, the Takeover Code in the UK specifically introduced rules concerning the 
conduct of public to private bids to ensure that a fair price was offered (Wright, et al., 
1991).1   
 
As discussed above, a potential buyer will seek to gain the backing of 
shareholders by means of irrevocable commitments. It will therefore be important to 
                                                          
1 A number of PTPs failed to complete in the period covered by this study (1998-
2003) because the price was reported to be too low (e.g., Litho Supplies) and/or 
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gain this support as early in the takeover process as possible because a lack of support 
may result in a bid not being made. This means that an indication of the extent of the 
firm’s current undervaluation will have to be incorporated into the offer price at an 
early stage of the process. For this reason, the use of abnormal returns around the date 
of the bid announcement is not appropriate because the time period is too short to take 
account of the period at which the offer was made. Weir et al (2005b) show that 
undervaluation persists over a period of time prior to going private and, using market 
capitalization data, find significant evidence of undervaluation in firms going private. 
Given the time involved in completing a PTP transaction, and the need to gain support 
from existing shareholders early in the process, we argue that the use of market 
capitalization data offers a useful point of reference against which to measure the 
extent of the market undervaluation and hence the premium offered. Hence: 
 H3a: There is a positive relationship between the premium paid in PTP MBOs and 
the extent of irrevocable commitments.  
 
Management in MBIs are outsiders and may not have access to such 
information. In addition, MBIs tend to involve more turnaround cases (Robbie and 
Wright, 1996). However, it is still the case that shareholders have to find an offer 
financially appealing. Therefore the higher the premium, the greater the irrevocable 
commitments gained.  Hence:  
 
H3b: There is a positive relationship between the premium paid in PTP MBIs and the 
extent of irrevocable commitments. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
because of failure to convince key block shareholders to sell (e.g., Capitol and 
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3.4. Bid rumours 
The extent to which information is publicly available may guide the private actions of 
the shareholders. There is evidence that press speculation about possible takeovers 
does contain valuable information (Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990). Press speculation 
about a possible acquisition will provide a proxy for potential outside interest in the 
company,( Lehn and Poulsen 1989).  
 
External shareholders may have a greater incentive to commit to the PTP 
where they are convinced that the likelihood of a competing bidder appearing is 
minimal. The less there is press speculation, the less likely it is that other buyers are 
interested in the company. This will make it easier for those wishing to take the 
company private to gain support from other shareholders. We therefore expect that 
less take-over speculation will make it easier to gain backing to take the company 
private in an MBO.  Hence: 
 
H4a: There is a negative relationship between takeover rumours in PTP MBOs and 
the extent of irrevocable commitments. 
 
The emergence of an MBI bid may suggest to external shareholders that if one 
outside bidder is available, so might others. Hence, in respect of MBIs we also expect 
takeover rumours to be negatively associated with irrevocable commitments: 
 
H4b: There is a negative relationship between takeover rumours in PTP MBIs and the 
extent of irrevocable commitments. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Professional Staff). 
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3.5. Private equity firms 
The growing interest in the role of venture capitalists (VCs) and private equity firms 
and the stock market has tended to focus on IPOs of VC-backed firms (Brav and 
Gompers, 1997; Lerner, 1994; Espenlaub et al 2000). The presence of venture capital 
and private equity investors has an important influence on the going public process, 
particularly if these financiers are more experienced and reputable. Supportive 
evidence from IPOs of venture-backed firms is provided by Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) and Gompers (1996) and for IPOs of private equity-backed LBOs by Jelic et 
al. (2005).  Going private also usually involves the participation of private equity 
providers, some of which may have strong reputations as specialists in buy-out 
transactions (Kaplan, 1991; Baker and Smith, 1998).  
 
It is reasonable to argue that the choice of private equity provider may be 
linked to the provider’s reputation (Kester and Luehrman, 1995). One with a 
successful track record may encourage shareholders to commit to a deal because they 
will regard this as providing some sort of seal of approval to the plan and that the 
equity provider will be able to secure sufficient funding for the deal.  
 
Reputable private equity firms may therefore be more able to persuade 
existing shareholders to commit to a buy-out bid. Their idiosyncratic skills may 
enable reputable private equity firms to identify and realize gains that others cannot 
and hence offer a more convincing rationale to existing shareholders. More reputable 
private equity firms backing management in an MBO may also provide a certification 
role in that they may be perceived to be associated with offering a fair priced deal to 
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protect their reputation in order to access future deals. Thus the higher the reputation 
of the private equity firm, the more likely that shareholders will commit to the deal, 
especially in PTPs involving MBOs. The above arguments also apply to MBIs. 
Therefore, for MBOs and MBIs, the higher the reputation of the private equity 
provider, the greater the irrevocable commitments. Hence:  
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the reputation of the private equity firm 
supporting a PTP and the extent of irrevocable commitments. 
 
3.6. Board ownership 
Evidence of higher board shareholdings in firms going private was found by Maupin 
(1987) and Halpern et al (1999). An MBO’s irrevocable commitments will normally 
include all or most of the current management’s shareholdings in addition to any 
external backing they may receive. Therefore as board ownership increases, 
irrevocable commitments will also increase. Although there is an inherent conflict of 
interest between institutional shareholders and managers in an MBO bid, it is likely 
that significant board ownership will encourage other shareholders to back the bid to 
go private since a board shareholding that is sufficiently large may make an opposing 
bid unlikely (Song and Walkling, 1993). Thus, for MBOs, we expect that the higher 
the board shareholdings, the higher the irrevocable commitments. Hence: 
 
H6a: There is a positive relationship between board shareholdings in PTP MBOs and 
the extent of irrevocable commitments. 
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With respect to MBIs, if the outside buyers wanted to complete the process 
without informing the management of the takeover bid, the buyers would simply gain 
as much support as possible from other shareholders.  Insiders who are not involved in 
an MBI attempt may be concerned that a successful hostile MBI may lead to their 
removal. Where boards are dominated by internal management, evidence suggests 
that management may not be able to influence the outcome once a hostile bid occurs 
(Sudarsanam, 1995; O’Sullivan and Wong, 1999). This suggests that where 
institutional shareholders are unhappy with incumbent management’s performance, 
yet incumbent board members have large equity stakes, they may try to increase the 
probability of an outside bid succeeding by being even more willing to offer 
irrevocable commitments. PTPs involving hostile MBI bids are, however, rare 
(CMBOR, 2003).  
 
An alternative explanation is that external buyers may have the incumbent 
management on their side. This may arise, for example where the PTP is initiated by a 
private equity firm that recognises that there is a need to supplement at least some of 
the incumbent team with stronger external management; incumbent management may 
be retained as they have important specific knowledge about the business. In these 
cases, it may be easier to persuade other shareholders to support the bid before it is 
made public. This would also suggest a positive relationship between irrevocable 
commitments and board ownership for MBIs. Hence: 
 
H6b: There is a positive relationship between board shareholdings in PTP MBIs and 
the extent of irrevocable commitments. 
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4. UK Public to Privates: sector and sample issues 
4.1. UK public to private characteristics and issues 
In the US, PTPs first appeared in significant numbers in the 1980s. In the UK, PTPs 
were in evidence from the mid-1980s but, as Figure 1 shows, activity was modest 
(Wright et al 2000). The UK experienced a significant increase in the number and 
value of public-to-private transactions during the late 1990s. During the eight year 
period 1990-1997, only 37 PTPs took place in total (an average of 4.6 per year) 
whereas during the three year period 1998-2003, there were 205 PTPs (an average of 
34 per year) (CMBOR, 2003).  The average value of each deal was £29.8 million for 
1990-1997 and £136.28 million for 1998-2003, which represents a 4.57 fold increase 
in deal size. Many firms that go private are relatively small. For example, even in the 
period 1998-2003, 90% of PTPs had a market capitalization of less than £300 million 
(approx $500 million). The increased importance of PTPs in the overall MBO market 
is highlighted by the fact that from accounting for 2.8% of the total MBO market 
value over the period 1990-97, they accounted for 26.2% during the period 1998-
2003.  We therefore focus on the period in which there was a significant increase in 
PTP activity. 
 
4.2. Data 
Data were obtained for public-to-private transactions completed in the UK during the 
period 1998-2003. The data included performance, ownership, take-over speculation 
and private equity provider information. This gave us a final sample of 155 public-to-
private transactions. The names of firms going private were provided by the Center 
for Management Buy-out Research (CMBOR), which is based at the University of 
Nottingham, and which comprises the effective population of buy-outs in the UK.  
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The CMBOR database is compiled from a wide range of sources including twice 
yearly surveys of private equity and debt providers to buy-outs2, press releases by 
these financiers, the financial press, stock exchange circulars issued by companies and 
companies’ annual reports. The database has no lower size cut-off. Information about 
irrevocable commitments was obtained from the offer documents, Financial Times 
Intelligence and Vickers (2000). CMBOR also provided data on the private equity 
providers funding and their reputations. Data on the value of the bids were obtained 
from CMBOR. Information relating to takeover rumours was taken from Financial 
Times Intelligence Service. Data on board shareholdings were taken from the 
PriceWaterhouse Corporate Register. Accounting data were taken from Company 
Analysis.   
 
The distribution of the sample over each of the years 1998-2003 is shown in 
Table 1 in terms the total value, total number and mean value per deal.  
 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
In our sample, the value of PTPs increased from £2,739 million in 1998 to 
£4,437 million in 2000 and by 2003, it was £1,790 million. In total, the sample’s 
value of bids was £17,863 million. The average value of bids over the period is 
£115.25 million. The average value increased from £105.34 million in 1998 to 
£164.43 million in 2000 but has been declining since to £68.84 million in 2003. This 
indicates that PTPs are on average getting smaller even though the number has been 
increasing.  A similar pattern applies to MBOs with the mean value of deals 
                                                          
2 These surveys generally obtain a 100% response rate from all the financiers active in the buy-out 
market as they receive a free copy of a quarterly review of aggregate market trends based on the data 
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increasing from £105.3 million in 1998 to £164.4 million in 2000 and subsequently 
falling to £68.84 in 2003. Although there were more MBOs in 2003 compared to 
2002, the number is lower than in 1999. The number of MBIs has remained relatively 
stable over the period but there have been substantial changes to the average value of 
deals with the figures ranging from £390 million in 2000 to £47.34 million in 2001. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the sample by sector. We find that PTPs 
occur in a wide range of sectors, with the most common being Household Goods, 
Engineering, General Retailing and Support Services. Other sectors with relatively 
large numbers of PTPs are Distribution, Leisure and Hotels and Real Estate. The final 
column in Table 2 shows the number of PTPs as a percentage of the total number of 
firms in each of the industrial classifications over the period 1998-2003. PTPs are 
relatively more common in a number of sectors, particularly in Diversified Industrials, 
Alcoholic Beverages, Household Goods, Food Retailers and Engineering. In contrast, 
they are less common, relative to the number of firms, in Media, Other Financial 
Services, Information Technology Hardware and Software and Computer Services. 
MBOs are also more frequent in Building and Construction, Household Goods, Media 
and Support Services. MBIs are relatively more common in sectors such as 
Engineering, General Retailers and Leisure and Hotels. 
 
Table 3 presents the range of irrevocable commitments gained for PTPs, 
MBOs and MBIs. In relation to PTPs in general, 23.40% of the sample gained up to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
they supply which is recognized as the leading source of information in the market. 
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20% irrevocables and some 60% achieved at least 50.06% support from shareholders 
prior to the bid announcement. The most common level of support came in the fourth 
quintile, with between 50.06% to 57.84% support. MBOs also show significant 
evidence of pre-bid support with 40% of MBOs winning more than 50.76% 
acceptances before the bid announcement. The top quintile achieved over 60% 
acceptances. MBIs also achieve substantial pre-bid support with 60% gaining the 
support of at least 36.62% of the shares before the bid announcement. In general, MBI 
irrevocable commitments are slightly lower than those for MBOs but the difference is 
not significant.  
 
The table shows clear evidence of private activity and that the bidders had 
been successful in gaining significant support for their bids prior to the bids being 
made public. The median irrevocable commitments figure for PTPs is 44.06%; for 
MBOs it is 45.83%; and for MBIs it is 42.10%. These figures indicate that the bidders 
were in an extremely strong position as soon as the announcement of the bid was 
made public and that potential alternative bidders would be in a difficult position if 
they put forward an alternative bid. Irrevocable commitments therefore offer an 
additional insight into the workings of the takeover process. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
 
 
4.3 Model Specification 
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The hypotheses developed in section 3 are tested using OLS. Specifically, we 
operationalise the following general model: 
iii
iiiii
BoardshROA
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The variables used in the analysis are defined as follows: 
 
i. dependent variable 
Irrevocables, as the dependent variable, is the percentage of equity committed to the 
bidder by the existing shareholders before the bid announcement.  
 
ii. independent variables 
 
LnBidValue is the log of the value of the bid (hypothesis 1). Performance is measured 
by return on assets, ROA, which is defined as earnings before interest and tax deflated 
by the book value of total assets at the last published accounts (hypothesis 2). The bid 
premium, Premium, is the value of the bid deflated by the firm’s market capitalization 
at the date of the last accounts (hypothesis 3). Speculation about a possible take-over, 
Rumours, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the financial press had 
reported rumors of take-over interest and zero if not (hypothesis 4). It refers to the 
reporting of takeover speculation over the period one month to eighteen months prior 
to the announcement of the PTP. We use all press speculation, as Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989), as a measure of pressure from the market for corporate control because this 
reflects the extent publicly available information about possible outside interest in the 
company. The standing of a private equity provider was measured by Reputation, a 
dummy variable which took the value of 1 if a private equity provider was used in 
more than two public to private deals in our sample and zero if not (hypothesis 5). 
Boardsh measures equity ownership of the board deflated by total assets at the last 
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published accounts (hypothesis 6). We adjust for size because here is evidence that 
board ownership and company size are negatively related, Mikkelson and Partch 
(1989) and Song and Walkling (1993). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 4 provides an overview of the sample’s characteristics and correlations. The 
mean percentage irrevocable commitments received was 42.25 per cent, although 
there was a large standard deviation around this level of 20.86 per cent. The median 
was 44.60 per cent. The public to private firms were on average of modest size, with a 
mean bid value of £115.25 million but there was a large variation around this position 
with a standard deviation of £184.91 million. The mean deflated board shareholding 
was 1.10 with, again a large standard deviation of 4.76. On average, 52 per cent of the 
sample experienced rumours of take-over interest as reported in the financial press. 
Overall, 32 per cent of the deals used venture capital firms that were involved in more 
than two of the deals in the sample. The average return on assets was 4.90 per cent. 
 
TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
 
Table 4 also reports the correlation matrix for the independent variables. High 
correlations indicate the presence of multicollinearity. None of the correlations are 
excessively high and when the regressions were run, neither the eigen values, which 
ranged from 0.048 to 0.0925, nor the variance inflation factors, which ranged from 
1.064 to 1.406, were near their critical levels for indicating the presence of 
multicollinearity.  
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5.2 Multivariate Results 
We present results for three sets of dependent variable (Table 5). Model 1 refers to all 
PTPs, model 2 refers to MBOs only and model 3 refers to MBIs. Model 1 shows that 
as hypothesised, for all PTPs, bid value (Hypothesis H1) and press speculation 
(Hypothesis H4) are both negative and significant. We also find, again consistent with 
our hypothesis, that board shareholdings are positive and significant (Hypothesis H6). 
However, contrary to expectations, neither bid premiums (H3) nor the return on assets 
(H2) are significant. The model has normally distributed residuals and is significant at 
the 5 per cent level. 
 
TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
 
The results for MBOs offer stronger support for our hypotheses. Model 2 
shows that, as hypothesised, irrevocable commitments are lower the larger the bid 
value (Hypothesis 1), indicating that the more diffuse nature of shareholdings in larger 
firms makes it harder to gain irrevocable commitments. We also find that, consistent 
with Hypothesis 3a, higher premiums bring about greater irrevocable commitments. 
Thus existing shareholders are more likely to commit to a buyer, the greater the 
financial benefit gained from the bid. Consistent with our expectations we also find 
that irrevocable commitments are higher where take-over speculation is lowest 
suggesting that shareholders are more willing to commit to a bidder if there is less 
likelihood of an alternative buyer (Hypothesis H4a). The private equity provider 
coefficient is significant and positive, as predicted (Hypothesis H5). This indicates 
that dealing with a highly reputable private equity provider increases irrevocable 
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commitments. This could work through the signal that it sends to shareholders, that is, 
that the management is serious in its attempt to go private because it has employed a 
highly reputable private equity provider. It could also be the result of the ability of the 
private equity provider to persuade other shareholders to back the bid. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 6a, we find that irrevocable commitments are higher the greater the board 
shareholdings. Although negative as predicted, the return on assets was not 
significant. The equation has normally distributed residuals and is significant at 5%. 
 
In contrast to the MBO sample, the results in Model 3 show that it is much less 
successful in explaining the extent of irrevocable commitments for MBI transactions 
Board shareholdings (Hypothesis 6b) is significant and positive as hypothesized. 
However, the other variables are insignificant and the F value of Model 3 is also 
insignificant.  
 
We extended the analysis to take account of the way in which differences in 
the stock market, as the result of the dot.com boom (and bust) may have affected the 
willingness of shareholders to give irrevocable commitments. Given the general fall in 
the stock market, it might be expected that shareholders would be more willing to 
agree to grant irrevocable commitments as a means of realising some of the lost value 
suffered by the market downturn. We constructed a dummy variable that took the 
value of one for the post dot.com boom, 2001-2003, and zero for the period of the 
boom, 1998-2000. The variable was positive but insignificant showing that 
irrevocable commitments were not dependent on the change in stock market 
conditions. 
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Song and Walkling (1993) reported a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and size. We followed Song and Walkling and took the square 
root of board ownership. It was insignificant for PTPs and MBOs with the MBI 
equation remaining insignificant. This suggests that non-linearities in the board 
ownership-size relationship are not present in PTPs. We also extended the analysis of 
the importance of ownership by assessing the impact of CEO, institutional and 
blockholding shareholders. In the UK, shareholdings in excess of 3% are reported. We 
obtained data for total institutional shareholdings in excess of 3% and for total 
blockholdings in excess of 3%. Institutions were defined as pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment funds. We expected a positive relationship between 
irrevocable commitments and institutional shareholdings. Blockholders were defined 
as private individuals or family members that were not on the board. We expected a 
positive relationship between irrevocable commitments and blockholder 
shareholdings. We found that institutional shareholdings were not significant in all 
three equations. Blockholdings were positive and significant at 5% for all PTPs but 
insignificant for MBOs and non-MBOs. We also found that CEO ownership was 
positive and significant at the 1% level for all PTPs and MBOs but was insignificant 
for non-MBOs. These results show that the support of key ownership groups or 
individuals is an important element in taking a firm private. 
 
6. Conclusions  
The paper has contributed to the debate about the sale process by analyzing the factors 
that influence the sale of firms going private. It has shown that bidders involved in 
PTPs gain substantial backing from shareholders before the bid is made public. It has 
also provided one of the first analyses of the factors that affect the extent of 
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irrevocable commitments negotiated by potential buyers prior to the public 
announcement of a bid. We have shown that the model explains MBOs much more 
effectively than MBIs. It was found that the irrevocable commitments for MBOs 
could be explained in terms of the value of the bid (Hypothesis 1), the premium 
offered to other shareholders (Hypothesis H3a), the extent of takeover speculation 
(Hypothesis H4a), the reputation of the private equity provider used (Hypothesis H5) 
and board ownership (Hypothesis 6). The Hypothesis 5 result is important because it 
shows that private equity firms and management involved in public to private MBOs 
were actively involved in gaining support for the deal by obtaining irrevocable 
commitments.  
 
The results provide an additional insight into the way in which public-to-
private transactions take place. Our results suggest that irrevocable commitments are 
used in an attempt to prevent alternative bidders from entering the bidding process. 
Consistent with Boone and Mulherin (2002), the results show that, for PTPs in general 
and MBOs in particular, private activity that takes place before the actual 
announcement of the bid can have an important impact on the process of going 
private. 
 27
References 
Baker, G., and Smith, G., The new financial capitalists: KKR and the creation of 
corporate value. 1998 Cambridge: CUP. 
Baliga, B., Moyer, R., and Rao, R., ‘CEO duality and firm performance’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 1996, 41-53. 
Berwin, S.J., Public-to Private: An Overview. SJ Berwin, 2003, London 
Betton, S., and Eckbo, B.E., ‘Toeholds, bid jumps and expected payoffs in takeovers.’ 
Review of Financial Studies, 13, 2000, 841-882. 
Boone, A.L., and Mulherin, J.H., Corporate restructuring and corporate 
auctions, 2002, Working Paper College of William and Mary 
Boone, A.L., and Mulherin, J.H., How are firms sold? 2003 Working Paper College 
of William and Mary 
Brav, A., and Gompers, P. ‘Myth or reality? The long-run underperformance of 
initial public offerings: evidence from venture capital and nonventure capital-backed 
companies’, Journal of Finance 52, 1997, 1791-1822. 
Bulow, J., Huang, M., and Klemperer, P. ‚Toeholds and takeovers’. Journal of 
Political Economy, 107, 1999, 427-454. 
Burch, T. ‘Locking out rival bidders: the use of lockup options in corporate mergers’. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 2001, 103-141. 
Citron, D., Wright, M., Ball, R., and Rippington, F. ‘Secured creditor recovery rates 
from management buy-outs in distress’. European Financial Management, 9, 2003, 
141-161. 
CMBOR, ‘Recent developments in the UK public to private buy-out market‘ 
Quarterly Review from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research, Nottingham 
University Business School, Winter, 1999, 19-40. 
 28
CMBOR, Quarterly Review from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research, 
Nottingham University Business School, Spring, 2003. 
Coates, J., and Subramanian, G. ‘A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and 
evidence.’ Stanford Law Review, 53, 2000, 307-396.  
Cornu, P., and Isakov, D. ‘The deterring effect of the medium of payment in takeover 
contests: theory and evidence from the UK.’ European Financial Management, 6, 
2000, 423-440. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., and Rice, E., ‘Going private: minority freeze outs and 
stockholders’ wealth.’ Journal of Law and Economics 27, 1984, 367-402. 
Easterwood, J. Singer, R, Seth, A., and Lang, D. ‘Controlling the conflict of interest in 
management buyouts,’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 1994, 521-522. 
Espenlaud, S. Gregory, A. and Tonks, I. Reassessing the long term performance of 
underperforming UK initial public offerings, 6, European Financial Management 
2000, 319-342. 
Freshfields, Bruckhaus, and Deringer, Public Takeovers in the UK. Freshfields, 
Bruckhaus, Deringer, 2000, London. 
Gompers, P.A., ‘Grandstanding in the venture capital industry.’ Journal of Financial 
Economics 42, 1996, 133-156. 
Graham, C. The venture capital perspective: Why do a public to private? Presentation 
at IBC Conference on Public-to-private Takeovers, London, 26th November, 2001.  
Grossman, S., and Hart, O. ‘Takeover bids, the free rider problem, and the theory of 
the corporation.’ Rand Journal of Economics, 11, 1980, 42-64. 
Halpern, P. Kieschnick, R., and Rotenberg, W., ‘On the heterogeneity of leveraged 
going private transactions.’ Review of Financial Studies 12, 1999, 281-309. 
Hansen, R., ‘Auctions of companies.’ Economic Inquiry 39, 2001, 30-43. 
 29
Jelic, R. Saadouni, B., and Wright, M., ‘Performance of private to public MBOs: the 
role of venture capital.’ Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32, 2005, 643-
682. 
Jarrell, G.A., Brickley, J.A., and Netter, J.M., ‘The market for corporate control: The 
evidence since 1980.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 1988, 49-68. 
Kaplan, S. N., ‘The effects of management buyouts on operations and value.’ Journal of 
Financial Economics 24, 1989, 217-54. 
Kaplan, S.N., ‘The staying power of LBOs’. Journal of Financial Economics 29, 1991, 
287-313. 
Kester, C., and Luehrman, T. ‘Rehabilitating the leveraged buyout.’ Harvard Business 
Review, 73, 1995, 119-130. 
Kieschnick, R. ‘Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private transactions 
revisited.’ Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 25, 1998, 187-202. 
Lee, D., Rosenstein, S., Rangan, N., and Davidson, W. ‘Board composition and 
shareholder wealth: the case of management buyouts,’ Financial Management, 21, 
1992, 58-72. 
Lehn, K., and Poulsen, A., ‘Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private 
transactions’. Journal of Finance XLIV, 1989, 771-787. 
Lerner, J. The syndication of venture capital investments, Financial Management, 23, 
1994, 16-27. 
Manigert, S., De Waele, K., Wright, M. Robbie, K., Desbrieres, P., Sapienza, H, and  
Beeckman, A., ‘Venture capitalists, investment appraisal and accounting information: 
a comparative study of the USA, UK, France, Belgium and Holland.’ European  
Financial Management, 6, 2000, 389-403. 
Marais, L., Schipper, K, and Smith, A. ‘Wealth effects of going private for senior 
 30
securities.’ Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 1989, 155-191. 
Maupin, R. ‘Financial and stock market variables as predictors of management buy 
outs’. Strategic Management Journal, 8, 1987, 319-327. 
Megginson, W. and. Weiss, K., ‘Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public 
Offerings’, Journal of Finance, 46, 1991, 879-903. 
Mikkelson,, W. And Partch, M. (1989) ‚Managers’ voting rights and corporate 
control’, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 263-290. 
Moeller, S.B., Schlingermann, F.P., and Stulz, R.M.‚ ‚Firm size and the gains from 
acquisitions’. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 2004, 201-228. 
Officer, M.S., ‘Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions.’ Journal of Financial 
Economics, 69, 2003, 431-467. 
Opler, T., and Titman, S., ‘The determinants of leveraged buyout activity, free cash 
flow versus financial distress costs.’ Journal of Finance, 48, 1993, 1985-1999. 
O’Sullivan, N., and Wong, P., ‘Board composition, ownership structure and hostile 
takeovers: Some UK evidence.’ Accounting and Business Research, 29, 1999, 139 
155. 
Pound, J., and Zeckhauser, R., ‘Clearly heard on the street: the effect of takeover 
rumors on stock prices’ Journal of Business 63, 1990, 291-308. 
Renneboog, L, Simons, T., and Wright, M., Leveraged public to private transactions 
in the UK. European Corporate Governance Institute Finance Working Paper 
78/2005. 2005. 
Robbie, K., and Wright, M., Management Buy-ins: Entrepreneurship, active investors 
and corporate restructuring. Manchester: 1996, MUP. 
Schwert, G. W., ‘Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions’. Journal of Financial 
Economics 41, 1996, 153-192. 
 31
Schwert, G. W., ‘Hostility in take-overs: in the eyes of the beholders’. Journal of 
Finance 55, 2000, 2599-2640. 
Song, M., and Walkling, R., ‘The impact of managerial ownership on acquisition 
attempts’. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28, 1993, 439-457. 
Sterling, M., and Wright, M., Management Buy-outs and the Law. 1990, Oxford: 
Blackwell Scientific. 
Sudarasanam. S., ‘The role of defensive strategies and ownership structure of target 
firms: Evidence from UK hostile takeover bids.’ European Financial Management, 
1, 1995, 223-240.  
Torabzadeh, D., and Bertin, W., ‘Leveraged buyouts and shareholder returns.’ The 
Journal of Financial Research 20, 1987, 313-319. 
Vickers, M., Public to Private Takeovers: The New Paradigms. 2000, Ashurst, Morris 
Crisp, London. 
Weir, C, and Laing, D., ‘Ownership structure, board composition and the market for 
corporate control in the UK: an empirical analysis’. Applied Economics, 29, 2003, 
579-611. 
Weir, C., Laing, D., and Wright, M., ‘Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and 
the market for corporate control: an analysis of the factors affecting public to private 
transactions in the UK’. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 32, 2005a, 909-
944. 
Weir, C., Laing, D. and Wright, M. ‘Undervaluation, private information, agency 
costs and the decision to go private’. Applied Financial Economics, 2005b, 15, 947 
961. 
White, H., ‘A heteroskedasticity-consistent co-variance matrix estimator and a direct 
test for heteroskedasticity’, Econometrica 49,1980, 817-838. 
 32
Wright, M., Thompson, S., Chiplin, B., and Robbie, K., Buy-ins and buy-outs: New 
strategies in corporate management. London: 1991, Graham & Trotman. 
Wright, M., Robbie, K., Chiplin, B., and Albrighton, M., ‘The development of an 
organizational innovation: management buy-outs in the UK 1980-97’. Business 
History, 42, 2000, 137-184. 
 33
Figure 1: UK Public to Private Buy-outs 1985-2003 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of deals 
Descriptive statistics on sample value of PTP, MBO and MBI deals, the number of 
deals by PTP, MBO and MBI and the average deal value for PTPs, MBOs and MBIs. 
The figures relate to the years 1998-2003.  
 
This table presents data on the total transaction value, the number of PTPs and the 
mean value of PTPs by the year of deal completion  
 
Year Total value of deals 
£m 
 
Number of deals Mean value per deal 
£m 
 PTP MBO MBI PTP MBO MBI PTP MBO MBI 
1998 
 
2739 54 2235 26 13 13 105.3
4 
38.77 171.9
2 
1999 
 
3605 1976 1629 33 25 8 109.7
9 
79.04 203.6
3 
2000 
 
4437 1707 331 27 20 7 164.4
3 
85.35 390.0
0 
2001 
 
4070 3739 331 28 21 7 145.3
7 
178.0
4 
47.34 
2002 
 
1222 138 1084 15 8 7 81.46 17.31 154.7
3 
2003 
 
1790 557 1239 26 18 8 68.84 60.62 154.9
0 
 
Source: CMBOR 
 
Some numbers do not sum because of rounding 
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Table 2  
Sample industrial classification distribution by the number of deals by PTP, MBO and 
MBI, the percentage of the sample and the percentage of the total number of firms in 
the sector over the period 1998-2003. 
 
Sector Number of deals Percentage of 
sample 
Percentage of 
firms in sector 
 Total 
PTP 
MBO MBI   
1100 Chemicals 
 
2 
 
0 2 1.3 1.22 
1300 Building and 
Construction 
 
9 9 0 5.8 2.07 
2400 Diversified 
Industrials 
 
4 1 3 2.6 6.25 
2500 Electronic and 
Electrical Engineering 
 
3 2 1 1.9 0.82 
2600 Engineering 
 
15 7 8 9.7 2.85 
3100 Automobiles 
 
2 2 0 1.3 2.38 
3200 Alcoholic 
Beverages 
 
2 1 2 1.3 3.85 
3400 Household Goods 
 
19 17 2 12.3 3.74 
3600 Healthcare 
 
6 4 2 3.9 2.33 
4300 Food Producer 
 
9 6 3 5.8 2.74 
5100 Distribution 
 
10 7 3 6.5 2.16 
5200 General Retailers 
 
13 6 7 8.4 2.63 
5300 Leisure and Hotels 
 
12 6 6 7.7 2.24 
5400 Media 
 
7 6 1 4.5 1.00 
5600 Food Retailers 
 
4 4 0 2.6 3.13 
5800 Support Services 
 
14 10 4 9.0 1.57 
5900 Transport 
 
5 4 1 3.2 1.63 
7800 Water 
 
2 1 1 1.3 2.78 
8600 Real Estate 
 
11 8 3 7.1 1.81 
8700 Other financial 
services 
 
1 0 1 0.6 0.14 
9300 Information 
technology hardware 
 
1 1 0 0.6 0.46 
9700 Software and 
computer services 
4 3 1 2.6 0.41 
 36
 
Table 3 
Irrevocable commitments by quintile. The percentage of PTPs, MBOs and MBIs that 
had irrevocable commitments in each quintile. Quintile 1 is lowest 20% of irrevocable 
commitments and quintile 5 is the highest 20% of irrevocable commitments. The 
median figure for each type of transaction is also given. 
 
 PTP % MBO % MBI % 
1 
 
23.40 24.08 19.28 
2 
 
37.42 37.04 36.63 
3 
 
50.06 50.57 49.46 
4 
 
57.84 60.52 55.02 
5 
 
>57.84 >60.52 >55.02 
Median 
 
44.60 45.86 42.10 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
This table provides means, standard deviations (SD) and correlation matrix for the 
variables included in the analysis. (1) Irrevocables is defined as the percentage of 
shares committed to the bidders before the public announcement of the bid, (2) 
Bidvalue is the value of the bid in millions of pounds, (3) Premium is defined as the 
value of the accepted bid divided by the market capitalisation at the date of the last 
accounts., (4) Rumours is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if rumours 
of a takeover had been reported in the financial press over the previous year and zero 
if not, (5) Reputation is a dummy variable which takes the value of one of the private 
equity provider had been involved in more than two deals in the sample and zero 
otherwise, (6) Boardsh is the percentage of issued capital owned by the board deflated 
by total assets, and (7) ROA is the return on assets defined as earnings before interest 
and taxes deflated by total assets . SD is the standard deviation.  
 
 Mean SD Irrevocables Bidvalue Premium Rumours Reputat
ion 
Boardsh 
Irrevocables 
 
42.25 20.86       
Bidvalue £m 
 
115.25 184.9
1 
 
-0.2526      
Premium 
 
1.38 0.61 
 
0.04.9 0.2420     
Rumours 
 
0.52 0.50 
 
-0.2098 0.2437 0.0612    
Reputation 
 
0.32 0.47 
 
0.0158 0.0826 0.0726 0.2248   
Boardsh  
 
1.10 4.76 0.2215 -0.3607 -0.0612 -0.1314 -0.339  
ROA (%) 
 
4.90 17.21 -0.0783 0.3167 -0.0577 0.1340 0.2196 -0.0232 
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Table 5  
OLS regression with the percentage of irrevocable commitments as the dependent 
variable 
 
This table presents OLS regression results where the dependent Irrevocables is the 
percentage of equity committed to the bidder by the existing shareholders before the 
PTP bid announcement. LnBidvalue is the natural log of the value of the bid. ROA is 
the return on assets defined as earnings before interest and taxes deflated by total 
assets. Premium is defined as the value of the accepted bid divided by the market 
capitalisation at the date of the last accounts. Reputation is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one of the private equity provider had been involved in more than 
two deals in the sample and zero otherwise. Rumours is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of one if rumours of a takeover had been reported in the financial press 
over the previous year and zero if not. Boardsh is the percentage of issued capital 
owned by the board deflated by total assets. t values in parenthesis are calculated from 
heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors (White 1980). Significance levels are: *** 
- significant at the 1% level; ** - significant at the 5% level; * - significant at the 10% 
level 
 
 
 
 Model 1 
PTP sample 
[n=155] 
Model 2 
MBO sample 
[n=105] 
Model 3 
MBI sample 
[n=50] 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Premium 3.3867 
(1.02) 
9.8701 
(2.81)*** 
-2.5881 
(1.11) 
ROA -0.0151 
(0.12) 
-0.0200 
(0.13) 
0.0494 
(0.34) 
Rumours -5.9871 
(2.11)** 
-9.5508 
(2.45)** 
-4.0660 
(0.59) 
Reputation 2.5637 
(0.73) 
7.3628 
(1.77)* 
-6.6058 
(0.85) 
Ln Bidvalue -2.6385 
(2.26)** 
-4.3403 
(2.77)*** 
-1.1756 
(0.55) 
Boardsh 0.6156 
(3.01)*** 
0.4205 
(2.58)** 
6.4870 
(5.36)*** 
Constant 49.3410 
(8.39)*** 
47.0390 
(6.79)*** 
49.9000 
(5.14)*** 
F test 3.28*** 4.08*** 1.63 
R2 0.12 0.20 0.12 
Residual normality 
chi square 
1.95 0.76 0.65 
 
 
 
